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In 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (OT), Alice inputs numbers x0, x1, Bob inputs a bit b and outputs
xb. Secure OT requires that Alice and Bob learn nothing about b and xb¯, respectively. We define
spacetime-constrained oblivious transfer (SCOT) as OT in Minkowski spacetime in which Bob must
output xb within Rb, where R0 and R1 are fixed spacelike separated spacetime regions. We show
that unconditionally secure SCOT is impossible with classical protocols in Minkowski (or Galilean)
spacetime, or with quantum protocols in Galilean spacetime. We describe a quantum SCOT protocol
in Minkowski spacetime, and we show it unconditionally secure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Relativistic quantum cryptography [1–28] is a recent
branch of physics-based cryptography in which the com-
bined power of quantum physics and relativity is ex-
ploited to guarantee security. It opens up possibilities
for novel cryptographic tasks that do not have analogues
in nonrelativistic settings [9, 11, 12, 14]. Furthermore,
it motivates the investigation of security for tasks that
were shown impossible in nonrelativistic quantum scenar-
ios. For example, unconditionally secure protocols for bit
commitment [29, 30], ideal coin tossing [31], strong coin
tossing with arbitrarily small bias [32, 33], all-or noth-
ing oblivious transfer [6, 34], 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer
[35], and more general two-party classical computation
[6, 35, 36] have been shown impossible in nonrelativistic
quantum settings. Although these impossibility proofs
also apply to relativistic quantum settings for must of
these tasks [5, 6, 36], they do not apply to bit commit-
ment [1, 3], and ideal and strong coin tossing [2], for
which unconditionally secure relativistic protocols have
been found [1–3, 13, 17, 23, 25].
Here we introduce a novel cryptographic task in
Minkowski spacetime, which we motivate with the fol-
lowing problem. We consider a particular reference
frame F agreed a priori by Alice and Bob. Alice has
two passwords x0,x1 ∈ {0, 1}n at the spacetime point
P = (0, 0, 0, 0), defined in F , permitting the access to
one of two computers: C0 or C1. The computer Ci can
be accessed if the password xi is input in the spacetime
region Ri, for i ∈ {0, 1}, where R0 and R1 are spacelike
separated and within the future light cone of P . Here we
consider thatRi is the intersection of the future light cone
of Qi =
(
h,−(−1)ih, 0, 0) and the set of spacetime points
T vi =
{(
t, x, y, z
)∣∣h ≤ t ≤ h+v, (x+(−1)ih)2+y2+z2 ≤
v2
}
for i = 0, 1, defined in the reference frame F , where
v > 0 is a small parameter, h > 0, the first entry in a
four vector is temporal, and we use units in which the
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FIG. 1. Two-dimensional spacetime diagram of the de-
fined cryptographic task, SCOT, in the reference frame F
in Minkowski spacetime. The vertical lines correspond to the
world lines of Alice’s and Bob’s agents. The small circles rep-
resent the spacetime points P = (0, 0, 0, 0), Q0 = (h,−h, 0, 0),
Q1 = (h, h, 0, 0) and Q¯ = (2h, 0, 0, 0). The dotted lines rep-
resent light rays, defining the future light cones of P , Q0 and
Q1. The spacetime regions Ri, where the passwords xi are
accepted as valid by the computers Ci, correspond to the filled
regions, for i = 0, 1. Q¯ is the spacetime point within the in-
tersection of the future light cones of Q0 and Q1 with the
smallest time coordinate, t = 2h, in the frame F .
speed of light is c = 1 (see Fig. 1). The password xi
is stored securely in the computer Ci in the past light
cone of Qi. The computer Ci is secure from Alice and
accepts the password only in the region Ri. Thus, the
password xi is only useful within Ri. Bob pays Alice at
P for one of the passwords. The deal is that Bob can
have access to xb in Rb, that Bob cannot access xb¯ in
Rb¯, and that Alice should be oblivious to Bob’s choice
b ∈ {0, 1}, anywhere in spacetime. We define the crypto-
graphic task that complies with the previous conditions
as spacetime-constrained oblivious transfer (SCOT).
SCOT is a relativistic version of 1-out-of-2 oblivious
transfer (OT) [37]. OT is an important cryptographic
task that can be used to implement more sophisticated
2tasks [38]. As mentioned above, OT cannot be imple-
mented with unconditional security in nonrelativistic, or
relativistic, quantum cryptography [5, 35]. The main ar-
gument in the proof of the no-go theorem for OT is that
the fact that Bob must learn Alice’s message xb with
probability equal to (or very close to) unity and that, in
a secure protocol, Alice does not have any information
(or has very little information) about Bob’s input b, im-
plies that there exists a unitary operation that Bob can
apply to his systems after learning x0 that transforms
his systems into a state that allows him to learn x1 with
probability equal to (or very close to) unity too [35]. Sim-
ilar arguments apply in the proofs that unconditionally
secure quantum bit commitment and classical determin-
istic two party computation are impossible [6, 29, 30, 36].
We note that these Mayers-Lo-Chau quantum attacks
[29, 30, 35] and more general impossibility proofs [6, 36]
do not apply to SCOT, because, due to Minkowski
causality, a nonlocal unitary acting on systems in R0
and R1 cannot be completed outside the intersection of
the future light cones of R0 and R1, hence, it cannot be
completed within R0 or R1. More generally, these no-go
theorems do not apply to spacetime-constrained multi-
party computation, which is defined as an extension of
multi-party computation [5–7] in which the inputs and
outputs are constrained to be input and output within
fixed constrained regions of spacetime, respectively, a re-
search problem initially outlined by Kent [14].
Our results are the following. We show that uncon-
ditionally secure SCOT cannot be achieved with clas-
sical protocols in Minkowski or Galilean spacetime, or
with quantum protocols in Galilean spacetime. Then,
after describing the general setting of relativistic quan-
tum cryptography, we give a quantum protocol for SCOT
in Minkowski spacetime, and we show it unconditionally
secure.
Interestingly, to the best of our knowledge, SCOT is
the second cryptographic task with classical inputs and
outputs that is proved unconditionally secure with rela-
tivistic quantum protocols, but whose unconditional se-
curity is known impossible with classical or nonrelativis-
tic quantum protocols, location-oblivious data transfer
being the first one [14]. In particular, there are relativis-
tic classical bit commitment protocols that are provably
unconditionally secure for a single round [1, 3, 23, 25],
that is, for a duration limited by the time that light takes
to travel between the labs of the participating agents.
We note that the first security proof for single-round
relativistic classical bit commitment protocols was given
by Kent (see Lemma 3 of Ref. [3]). There are conjectured
unconditionally secure [1, 3, 23] relativistic classical bit
commitment protocols with multiple rounds, whose dura-
tion can be extended arbitrarily long for a fixed distance
between the labs of the agents. These have been shown
secure against arbitrary classical attacks [1, 3, 23, 26, 27],
but remain to be shown secure against arbitrary quantum
attacks. Proving arbitrarily long relativistic, classical or
quantum, bit commitment protocols unconditionally se-
cure against arbitrary quantum attacks remains as an
important open problem.
II. SCOT IS IMPOSSIBLE IN A CLASSICAL OR
GALILEAN WORLD
We consider arbitrary SCOT protocols taking place
in a finite region of spacetime, hence, with R0 and R1
having a finite separation. We show that classical SCOT
protocols of this form cannot be unconditionally secure,
in Minkowski or Galilean spacetime. Then we argue that
unconditionally secure SCOT is impossible in a Galilean
quantum world, as follows from Lo’s no-go theorem [35]
for nonrelativistic quantum OT.
In general we can consider that Alice and Bob have
several agents who participate in the protocol at differ-
ent points of spacetime. In particular, the protocol in-
volves communication events from an agent of Alice to
an agent of Bob or vice versa at various spacetime points.
Without loss of generality we reduce the number of com-
munication events to three, occurring at P , Q0 and Q1,
respectively, where we assume that Alice and Bob have
adjacent labs of negligible extension. We consider first
that spacetime is Minkowski and Alice and Bob perform
a classical protocol. We assume there exists a classical
SCOT protocol that is secure against Alice. We show
that this protocol must be insecure against Bob.
We give below the main physical arguments of the
proof. Some mathematical details of the proof are given
in Appendix A. Let G, G0 and G1 be the sets of pos-
sible communication events between Alice and Bob at
the spacetime points P , Q0 and Q1, respectively. Let
P (g|x0,x1, b) be the probability that the communication
event g = (g, g0, g1) ∈ G¯ = G × G0 × G1 occurs in the
honest protocol, in general depending on Alice’s inputs
x0,x1 and on Bob’s input b. Since g is classical, Alice
and Bob can produce perfect copies of it, use some copies
in the protocol and keep others for record. In particular,
Alice’s agents at P , Q0 and Q1 can send a copy of g, g0
and g1 to her agents at the other spacetime points at the
speed of light, respectively. Since the protocol occurs in
a finite region of spacetime, the copies of g, g0 and g1
arrive to all of Alice’s agents after a finite time. Since
we assume that the protocol is secure against Alice, for
any fixed inputs x0,x1, Alice can guess Bob’s bit b with
a bounded probability
P cA ≤
1
2
+ δ, (1)
for some 0 ≤ δ << 1, where the labels “c” and “A”
denote “cheating Alice.” We show in Appendix A that
(1) implies
∑
g∈G¯
∣∣P (g|x0,x1, 0)− P (g|x0,x1, 1)
∣∣ ≤ 4δ. (2)
On the other hand, following the honest protocol with
any input b ∈ {0, 1}, Bob’s agents must be able to use
3the obtained value g and process it with some extra clas-
sical resources E in order to output xb in Rb with some
probability
P hB ≥ 1− ǫ, (3)
for some 0 ≤ ǫ << 1, where the labels “h” and “B”
denote “honest Bob.” Bob’s agents can prepare and dis-
tribute two copies of E before the protocol. Bob’s agents
can produce two perfect copies of the exchanged mes-
sages g, g0 and g1. Since the communication events g
occur with probabilities P (g|x0,x1, b) that are very close
for different values of b ∈ {0, 1}, as given by (2), Bob’s
agents can run two simultaneous protocols, one with in-
put b = 0 and the other one with input b = 1 and thus
output both x0 in R0 and x1 in R1 with probability P
c
B
very close to unity, satisfying
P cB ≥ 1− 2ǫ− 4δ, (4)
as we show in Appendix A, where the labels “c” and
“B” denote “cheating Bob.” Thus, the SCOT protocol
is insecure against Bob, as claimed. This result trivially
holds in Galilean spacetime because in this case Alice’s
agents can instantaneously communicate the values of g,
g0 and g1.
Now we consider arbitrary quantum SCOT protocols
in Galilean spacetime. In principle, Alice’s and Bob’s
agents can communicate classical information instanta-
neously. They can also transmit quantum states between
distant locations instantaneously via quantum teleporta-
tion [39]. Thus, we can consider the region of three di-
mensional space in which the protocol takes places as two
big labs adjacent to each other, one controlled by Alice
and the other one by Bob. The output regions R0 and R1
become irrelevant in this scenario because if Bob can out-
put xb anywhere in his lab then he can output xb in Rb.
This is the scenario of nonrelativistic quantum 1-out-of-2
oblivious transfer. Therefore, Lo’s no-go theorem stating
that secure OT is impossible in nonrelativistic quantum
cryptography applies [35]. It follows that secure SCOT
is impossible in a Galilean quantum world.
III. THE SETTING FOR RELATIVISTIC
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
We describe the setting for relativistic quantum cryp-
tography that applies to the protocol we present here
[12–15]. Alice and Bob consist of three different agents,
each controlling a secure laboratory. We denote Alice’s
agents by A, A0 and A1, and Bob’s agents by B, B0, and
B1. Agents A and B have secure laboratories at space
regions adjacent to the point L = (0, 0, 0), while agents
Ai and Bi have secure laboratories at space regions ad-
jacent to the points Li = (−(−1)ih, 0, 0), for i ∈ {0, 1}.
For clarity of the presentation we assume that Alice’s
and Bob’s laboratories have negligible extension and are
located exactly at L, L0 and L1 (see Fig. 1).
We also assume that the processing of classical and
quantum information at each laboratory is secure, per-
fect and instantaneous. We assume that the transmission
of classical or quantum systems between laboratories is
free of errors and at the speed of light. Bob has secure
and error-free quantum channels between his laborato-
ries. Alice has secure and error-free classical channels
between hers. There are not any losses of the transmit-
ted classical or quantum states. Finally, we require that
the spacetime regions R0 and R1 at which Bob needs to
produce his outputs are secure from Alice.
IV. UNCONDITIONALLY SECURE SCOT
We present an unconditionally secure quantum SCOT
protocol in Minkowski spacetime. Alice’s input xi =
(x0i , x
1
i , . . . , x
n−1
i ) ∈ {0, 1}n is generated randomly and
securely by A in the past light cone of P , and stored se-
curely in the computer Ci in the past light cone of Qi, for
i = 0, 1.
In the past light cone of P , A prepares r =
(r0, r1, . . . , rn−1) ∈ {0, 1}n and s = (s0, s1, . . . , sn−1) ∈
{0, 1}n randomly, and n qubits A0, . . . , An−1 in BB84
states. Aj is prepared in |ψsjrj 〉 for j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1,
where |ψ0k〉 = |k〉, and |ψ1k〉 = 1√2
(|0〉 + (−1)k|1〉), for
k ∈ {0, 1}, and where 〈0|1〉 = 0. A gives B the qubits
Aj with their labels j at P . Using her secure classical
channels, A sends s and ti = r⊕ xi to Ai, who receives
them at Qi, where ⊕ denotes bitwise sum modulo two.
Ai gives s and ti to Bi at Qi.
Immediately after receiving the qubits Aj from A at
P , B sends them through his secure quantum channel to
Bb, in a consecutive order according to their labels j. At
Qb, for each j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, Bb measures Aj in the
basis Dsj = {|ψsj0 〉, |ψsj1 〉}, obtaining the bit outcome rj .
Then, Bb computes r ⊕ tb, which equals xb. Thus, Bb
outputs xb at Qb, as required.
We discuss in Appendix B how this protocol can be
modified to allow for a small fraction of errors γ < 0.015.
We give in Appendix C an unconditionally secure proto-
col for SCOT, a slight variation of this protocol, in which
the geometry of the output regions Ri are defined differ-
ently: the bit xji must be output at the spacetime point
Qji = (h+ jδ,−(−1)ih, 0, 0) for j = 0, 1 . . . , n− 1, where
δ > 0.
A. Security against Alice
Our protocol is clearly secure against Alice given our
assumptions that Bob’s laboratories and quantum chan-
nels are secure.
4B. Security against Bob
We note that Bob could easily output x0 in R0 and
x1 in R1, if R0 and R1 were allowed to be timelike sepa-
rated. For example, if R0 is defined as above, but R1 is
allowed to be the intersection of the future light cone of
Q¯ = (2h, 0, 0, 0) (see Fig. 1) and a small neighborhood of
Q¯ in the frame F , Bob can play a honest strategy to out-
put x0 at Q0 and also output x1 at Q¯. Agent B0 obtains
r at Q0, outputs x0 at Q0 and sends r to B at the speed
of light. After receiving t1 at Q1, B1 sends t1 to B at the
speed of light. Agent B receives r and t1 at Q¯, where he
computes r ⊕ t1, which equals x1. Thus, B outputs x1
at Q¯. This cheating strategy is consistent with the gen-
eral Mayers-Lo-Chau quantum attacks [29, 30, 35]: Bob
can learn x0 at Q0 and then implement a nonlocal uni-
tary on the systems held by his agents that allows him
to learn also x1 at some spacetime point Q¯. However,
due to Minkowski causality, this nonlocal unitary cannot
be completed outside the intersection of the future light
cones of Q0 and Q1, hence, Q¯ cannot be spacelike sep-
arated from Q0 as required by the definition of SCOT.
Thus, in general, the spacelike separation of the space-
time points Q0 and Q1 at which Bob’s outputs must be
produced guarantees the security of our protocol, as we
show below.
Consider an arbitrary cheating strategy by Bob in
which he outputs x0 at Q0 and x1 at Q1 with prob-
ability pn. Since in a honest strategy, Bob achieves
pn = 2
−n by randomly guessing xb¯, ideally, unconditional
security would be defined by satisfaction of a bound
pn ≤ 2−n+ f(m), where m is a security parameter inde-
pendent of n such that f(m)→ 0 asm→∞. In practice,
given the motivation for SCOT in which xi is a password
that the computer Ci accepts as correct if input within
Ri, we define unconditional security by satisfaction of
pn ≤ f(m), (5)
where the security parameter m is allowed to be m = n,
and where f(m) → 0 as m → ∞. We show below that
our SCOT protocol is unconditionally secure according
to definition (5) by taking m = n. Importantly, we show
that f(n)→ 0 exponentially in n.
An arbitrary cheating strategy by Bob is as follows. At
the spacetime point P , agent B applies a unitary opera-
tion U on A = A0A1 · · ·An−1 and some ancillary system
B in a fixed pure state |χ〉, then he sends the subsys-
tem B0 of AB = B0B1 to B0 and the other subsystem,
B1, to B1, who receive them at the respective spacetime
points Q0 and Q1. The Hilbert spaces of B0 and B1
have arbitrary finite dimensions. After receiving s and
ti = xi ⊕ r at Qi, Bi implements a measurement Mi,s =
{Πrii,s}ri∈{0,1}n on Bi chosen according to the value of
s, obtaining the output ri = (r
0
i , r
1
i , . . . , r
n−1
i ) ∈ {0, 1}n.
Finally, at the spacetime pointQi, Bi outputs yi = ri⊕ti,
which equals xi if ri = r.
We argue that a general cheating strategy is as de-
scribed above. Any measurement implemented by B at
P can be delayed until the spacetime points Qi. The
measurement implemented by Bi at Qi in general de-
pends on s but not on ti = xi ⊕ r, because the state
|ψsjrj 〉 of qubit Aj depends on sj but not on tji , the jth
entry of ti, which is random. Similarly, in general, the
goal of this measurement is to output a n−bits string ri
which must equal r with high probability because of the
encoding xi = ti ⊕ r.
We show below that
pn ≤ p¯n, (6)
where p¯n ≡
(
1
2 +
1
2
√
2
)n
. Thus, unconditional security,
as defined by (5), follows. We note that the bound (6)
is achieved by the following simple strategy. Agent B
measures Aj in the Breidbart basis {|ω0〉, |ω1〉}, where
|ω0〉 = cos(pi8 )|0〉 + sin(pi8 )|1〉 and |ω1〉 = − sin(pi8 )|0〉 +
cos(pi8 )|1〉. Then, B sends the outcome to Bi, who outputs
it as rji , for j = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1 and for i = 0, 1.
We show (6). The proof follows from the result of
Ref. [40]. Tomamichel et al. [40] consider the follow-
ing task, which they call G×nBB84. Two parties, Bob and
Charlie, prepare a tripartite quantum state |ξ〉ABC . Bob
and Charlie keep the respective systems B and C, whose
Hilbert spaces have arbitrary finite dimensions, and send
the system A = A0A1 · · ·An−1 to another party, Alice,
where each system Aj is a qubit. After the preparation
of |ξ〉ABC , Bob and Charlie are not allowed to commu-
nicate. Alice randomly generates s = (s0, . . . , sn−1) ∈
{0, 1}n and measures Aj in the BB84 basis Dsj , obtain-
ing the outcome rj ∈ {0, 1}, for j = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. Alice
announces s to Bob and Charlie. Bob and Charlie apply
measurements M0,s and M1,s, which in general depend
on s, on systems B and C, obtaining the n-bit outcomes
r0 and r1, respectively. Bob and Charlie win the game
if r0 = r1 = r, where r = (r0, r1, . . . , rn−1). It is shown
in [40] that the maximum probability to win the G×nBB84
game, optimized over all allowed quantum strategies by
Bob and Charlie, is given by p¯n.
We relate a cheating strategy by Bob in our SCOT
protocol to a strategy by Bob and Charlie in the G×nBB84
game. In our SCOT protocol, it is equivalent if A pre-
pares n Bell states |Φ+〉A′A = ⊗n−1j=0 |φ+〉A′jAj , she sends
A = A0A1 · · ·An−1 to B and measures qubit A′j in the
basis Dsj . If Alice obtains outcome rj for qubit A′j ,
then qubit Aj projects into the state |ψsjrj 〉. Consider
a G×nBB84 game in which Bob and Charlie initially prepare
|ξ〉A′AB = (1A′⊗UAB)|Φ+〉A′A|χ〉B and send A′ to Alice,
Bob keeps B0 and Charlie keeps B1, where AB = B0B1,
and where U and |χ〉 are the unitary operation and the
state used in the cheating strategy by Bob in our SCOT
protocol. Then, by identifying agents B0 and B1 in our
SCOT protocol with Bob and Charlie in the G×nBB84 game,
it follows that Bob’s cheating probability in our SCOT
protocol is upper bounded by pn ≤ p¯n, as claimed.
5V. DISCUSSION
Here we defined the cryptographic task of spacetime-
constrained oblivious transfer (SCOT). We showed that
unconditionally secure SCOT cannot be achieved with
classical protocols in Minkowski or Galilean spacetime,
or with quantum protocols in Galilean spacetime. We
gave a quantum SCOT protocol in Minkowski spacetime
that we proved unconditionally secure.
It is straightforward to see that our SCOT protocol can
be used to implement unconditionally secure bit commit-
ment. Bob commits to a bit b at the spacetime point P .
Assuming that Alice reads the passwords that Bob in-
puts into the computers Ci, Bob unveils his commitment
by introducing the password xb into Cb within the re-
quired spacetime region Rb.
On the other hand, unconditionally secure SCOT can-
not in general be obtained from unconditionally secure
relativistic bit commitment. This follows because there
are unconditionally secure classical relativistic bit com-
mitment protocols [1, 3, 23, 25], but unconditionally se-
cure SCOT cannot be achieved with classical protocols,
as we proved here. It would be interesting to investi-
gate under what general conditions unconditionally se-
cure SCOT can be used to implement unconditionally
secure relativistic bit commitment.
Furthermore, we note that our SCOT protocol seems
quite similar to Kent’s quantum relativistic bit commit-
ment protocol [17], in that in both protocols random
BB84 states are transmitted at the spacetime point P .
An important difference between our SCOT protocol and
Kent’s bit commitment protocol [17] is that in our pro-
tocol, at the spacetime point Qi, Bob’s agent Bi is in-
formed of the bases on which Alice prepared the trans-
mitted qubits, while in Kent’s protocol the committer
(who would be Bob in our notation, but is Alice in the
notation of Refs. [17, 18]) is never revealed the bases by
the other party. This implies that the security proofs of
Kent’s protocol [17], for example the one by Croke and
Kent [18], cannot in general be adapted to show the secu-
rity of our SCOT protocol, because in a general cheating
strategy by Bob in our protocol, Bob’s agents Bi apply
measurements that depend on the bases on which Alice
prepared the qubits, which is not possible in the cheating
strategies in the bit commitment protocol [17].
The defined task of SCOT can be generalized to set-
tings in which Alice has m inputs x0,x1, . . . ,xm−1 ∈
{0, 1, . . . , d − 1} that Bob must output within spacelike
separated regions R0, R1, . . . , Rm−1 according to his in-
put b ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − 1}. One can also investigate dif-
ferent configurations of the geometry for the output and
input regions (see an example in Appendix C). Addition-
ally, one can relax the condition that Alice should not be
able to learn Bob’s input b anywhere in spacetime to the
weaker requirement that Alice should not learn b within
some fixed particular region of spacetime.
It would be interesting to investigate whether SCOT
protocols can be proved unconditionally secure from fun-
damental physical principles in more general models of
spacetime or in postquantum theories of correlations. For
example, can we find SCOT protocols that are provably
unconditionally secure from the violation of Bell inequal-
ities and the no-signaling principle (as recently done for
relativistic quantum bit commitment protocols [25])?
Finally, it is interesting to investigate whether
SCOT can be combined with other cryptographic tasks
to perform more general spacetime-constrained multi-
party computation and other sophisticated cryptographic
tasks.
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Appendix A: Details of the impossibility proof for
unconditionally secure classical protocols for SCOT
We show (2). For fixed given values of x0,x1, we define
the sets G¯0 ≡ {g ∈ G¯|P (g|x0,x1, 0) ≥ P (g|x0,x1, 1)}
and G¯1 ≡ {g ∈ G¯|P (g|x0,x1, 1) > P (g|x0,x1, 0)}. We
consider a cheating strategy by Alice in which she first
follows the honest protocol and then guesses that b = i
if a communication event g ∈ G¯i takes place. Alice’s
probability to guess b correctly, given her inputs x0,x1,
is thus
P cA =
1
2
1∑
i=0
∑
g∈G¯i
P (g|x0,x1, i). (A1)
It follows that
P cA =
1
2
+
1
2
∑
g∈G¯i
(
P
(
g|x0,x1, i
)− P (g|x0,x1, i¯
))
=
1
2
+
1
2
∑
g∈G¯i
∣∣∣P (g|x0,x1, i
)− P (g|x0,x1, i¯
)∣∣∣,
(A2)
for i = 0, 1, where in the second line we used that
from the definition of G¯i, we have that P (g|x0,x1, i
) ≥
P
(
g|x0,x1, i¯
)
for all g ∈ G¯i and i ∈ {0, 1}. It follows
from (A2) that
P cA =
1
2
+
1
4
∑
g∈G¯
∣∣P (g|x0,x1, 0)− P (g|x0,x1, 1)
∣∣. (A3)
6Thus, we see from (A3) that satisfaction of (1) implies
that (2) must hold.
We show (4). The probability that Bob outputs xi
at Qi correctly following the honest protocol with input
b = i is given by
P h,iB =
1
22n
∑
x0,x1
∑
g∈G¯
P hB(xi|g,x0,x1, i)P (g|x0,x1, i),
(A4)
where P hB(xi|g,x0,x1, i) is the probability that Bob
guesses the value of xi correctly at the spacetime pointQi
following the honest protocol with input b = i given that
Alice’s inputs are x0,x1 and the communication event
g ∈ G¯ takes place, for i ∈ {0, 1}. From (3), the probabil-
ity that Bob succeeds in the honest protocol satisfies
P h,iB ≥ 1− ǫ. (A5)
Consider a cheating strategy by Bob in which he ini-
tially sets his input b = i and runs a honest protocol,
obtaining communication events g, g0 and g1 at P , Q0
and Q1, respectively. Bob thus outputs xi at Qi with
probability P h,iB . However, in addition to following the
honest protocol with input b = i, Bob’s agents perform
the following actions. They produce perfect copies of the
communicated messages g, g0 and g1 at P , Q0 andQ1, re-
spectively. They use these copies to simultaneously run a
honest protocol with the other input b = i¯, obtaining the
output xi¯ at Qi¯ with some probability P
i¯
B. The success
probability of this simultaneous protocol is given by
P i¯B =
1
22n
∑
x0,x1
∑
g∈G¯
P hB
(
xi¯|g,x0,x1, i¯
)
P
(
g|x0,x1, i
)
= P h,¯iB +
1
22n
∑
x0,x1
∑
g∈G¯
P hB
(
xi¯|g,x0,x1, i¯
)
∆(g,x0,x1, i)
≥ P h,¯iB −
1
22n
∑
x0,x1
∑
g∈G¯
P hB
(
xi¯|g,x0,x1, i¯
)∣∣∆(g,x0,x1, i)
∣∣
≥ P h,¯iB −
1
22n
∑
x0,x1
∑
g∈G¯
∣∣∆(g,x0,x1, i)
∣∣
≥ P h,¯iB − 4δ, (A6)
where ∆(g,x0,x1, i) ≡ P
(
g|x0,x1, i
)−P (g|x0,x1, i¯
)
, in
the second line we used P
(
g|x0,x1, i
)
= P
(
g|x0,x1, i¯
)
+
∆
(
g,x0,x1, i
)
and expression (A4), and in the last line
we used (2). It follows from (A5) and (A6) that Bob’s
success probability in this simultaneous protocol satisfies
P i¯B ≥ 1− ǫ− 4δ. Since ǫ << 1 and δ << 1, Bob obtains
both x0 at Q0 and x1 at Q1 with a probability P
c
B close
to unity: P cB ≥ P i¯B + P h,iB − 1 ≥ 1 − 2ǫ − 4δ, for any
i ∈ {0, 1}, which shows (4).
Appendix B: Allowing for errors
The SCOT protocol described in the main text can be
modified to allow for a small fraction of errors γ < 0.015.
A password yi is accepted as valid by Ci if it differs from
xi in at most γn bit entries. Under this condition, the
probability pγn that both B0 and B1 input valid pass-
words into C0 and C1, respectively, is bounded by pγn ≤(
22h(γ)p¯1
)n
, where h(γ) = −γ log2 γ− (1− γ) log2(1− γ)
is the binary entropy. This bound follows because the
probability to win a modified version of the G×nBB84 in
which a fraction γ of bit errors is allowed is not greater
than
(
22h(γ)p¯1
)n
[40]. Thus, for γ < 0.015, we have
22h(γ)p¯1 < 1, hence, unconditional security follows.
Appendix C: SCOT with modified geometry of the
output regions
We consider a SCOT scenario in which the geometry
of the output regions Ri is defined as follows. The bit
xji must be output at the spacetime point Q
j
i = (h +
jδ,−(−1)ih, 0, 0) for j = 0, 1 . . . , n− 1, where δ > 0. We
say that Bob outputs xi within Ri if he outputs x
j
i at Q
j
i
for all j = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
We give an unconditionally secure SCOT protocol for
the output regions defined above. In the past light cone
of P , A prepares r = (r0, r1, . . . , rn−1) ∈ {0, 1}n and
s = (s0, s1, . . . , sn−1) ∈ {0, 1}n randomly, and n qubits
A0, . . . , An−1 in BB84 states. The qubit Aj is prepared
in the state |ψsjrj 〉. A gives B the qubit Aj at the space-
time point Pj = (jδ, 0, 0, 0). Using her secure classical
channels, A sends the bits sj and tji = rj⊕xji to Ai, who
receives them at Qji . Agent Ai gives agent Bi these bits
at Qji .
Immediately after receiving Aj from A at Pj , B sends
it through his secure quantum channel to Bb. At Qjb, Bb
measuresAj in the BB84 basisDsj , obtaining the bit out-
come rj . Then, Bb computes the bit rj⊕ tjb, which equals
xjb. Thus, Bb outputs xjb at Qjb, for all j = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1,
as required.
1. Security against Alice
Similarly to the SCOT protocol given in the main text,
this protocol is secure against Alice, given our assump-
tions that Bob’s laboratories and quantum channels are
secure.
2. Security against Bob
The security against Bob follows trivially from the se-
curity proof of the SCOT protocol given in the main text.
We give an alternative security proof below.
In an arbitrary cheating strategy by Bob, at the space-
time point Pj , agent B applies a unitary operation Uj on
the qubit Aj , received fromA, and some ancillary system
7Ej in a fixed pure state |χ〉, then he sends the subsys-
tem Bj0 of AjEj = B
j
0B
j
1 to his agent B0 and the other
subsystem, Bj1, to his agent B1, who receive them at the
respective spacetime points Qj0 and Q
j
1. After receiving
the bits sj and t
j
i = x
j
i ⊕ rj at Qji , Bi implements a
measurement on Bji chosen according to the value of sj ,
obtaining a bit output rji . Finally, at the spacetime point
Qji , Bi outputs yji = rji ⊕ tji , which equals xji if rji = rj .
We argue that a general cheating strategy is of the
form described above. First, since the spacetime point
Qji where Bi must output xji is light like separated from
the spacetime point Pj where agent B receives the qubit
Aj encoding x
j
i , B must apply any quantum operations
on AjEj at Pj and instantaneously send B
j
i to Bi. This
implies that B cannot wait a time δ to receive the next
qubit Aj+1 at Pj+1 in order to apply a joint operation
on Aj and Aj+1.
Second, an arbitrary measurement that B might per-
form at Pj can be delayed until points Q
j
i . In par-
ticular, B cannot obtain any information about the
bits rj′ with j
′ > j encoded in subsequent qubits
Aj+1, Aj+2, . . . , An−1 by applying a measurement on Aj
because the bits rj and sj are random, hence, the state
|ψsjrj 〉 of qubit Aj does not encode any information about
bits rj′ or x
j′
i for j
′ 6= j. Similarly, B cannot obtain any
information about rj′ that is not already encoded in Aj′
by preparing some ancillaDj entangled with Aj and then
applying some joint measurement on DjAj′ , for j
′ > j.
Finally, the measurement implemented by Bi at Qji in
general depends on sj but not on t
j
i = x
j
i ⊕ rj because
the state |ψsjrj 〉 of qubit Aj depends on sj but not on
tji , which is random. Similarly, in general, the goal of
this measurement is to output a bit rji that equals rj
with high probability because of the encoding of xji via
tji = x
j
i ⊕ rj .
Let qj be the maximum success probability that B0
and B1 output xj0 and xji at Qj0 and Qj1, respectively.
As discussed above, in general, Bob must treat qubit Aj
independently of other qubits Aj′ . Since the protocol
that Alice follows to encode xji is the same for any j, and
bits xji and x
j′
i are encoded independently for any j
′ 6= j,
we have that qj = qj
′ ≡ q for all j, j′ ∈ {0, 1 . . . , n− 1},
which is achieved by the same strategy on AjEj for all
j. We show below that
q ≤ 1
2
(
1 +
1√
2
)
. (C1)
Since the probability that Bi outputs xji at Qji is inde-
pendent of the probability to output xj
′
i′ for j
′ 6= j, as
follows from the discussion above, we have that the max-
imum success probability that B0 and B1 output xj0 and
xj1 at Q
j
0 and Q
j
1, respectively, for all j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1
is pmaxn = (q)
n. It follows from (C1) that unconditional
security, as defined by equation (1) of the main text, is
satisfied.
We show (C1) by considering the case j = 0. We
simplify notation by setting A0 = A, E0 = E, B
0
i = Bi,
P0 = P , Q
0
i = Qi, x
0
i = xi, r0 = r, s0 = s and r
0
i = ri.
Let qi be the probability that Bi outputs xi at Qi, for
i ∈ {0, 1}, in a strategy achieving q. It follows that q ≤
1
2 (q0 + q1). We show below that
qmax = 1 +
1√
2
, (C2)
where qmax ≡ max{q0 + q1}, and where the maximum
is taken over all possible strategies by Bob, as described
above. Thus, (C1) follows. We note that qmax is achieved
if Bob applies 1 → 2 optimal symmetric cloning [41] of
the BB84 states to qubit A and sends a clone to Bi, who
then measures it in the BB84 basis Ds on which A was
prepared and outputs the outcome as ri, for i ∈ {0, 1}.
Alternatively, qmax is achieved if B measures A in the
Breidbart basis {|ω0〉, |ω1〉}, where |ω0〉 = cos(pi8 )|0〉 +
sin(pi8 )|1〉 and |ω1〉 = − sin(pi8 )|0〉 + cos(pi8 )|1〉 and sends
the outcome to agents Bi, who outputs it as ri.
We show (C2). After B applies the unitary operation
U , the system AE = B0B1 is transformed into
|Ψsr〉B0B1 = U |ψsr〉A|χ〉E . (C3)
In general, we can consider that the measurement ap-
plied by Bi on Bi is a projective measurement Mi,s =
{Πki,s}1k=0. This is because an arbitrary measurement can
be implemented by introducing an ancilla, included in Bi
at P , and then performing a projective measurement on
the whole system. Thus, we have
q0+q1 =
1
4
1∑
r=0
1∑
s=0
(
〈Ψsr|1⊗Πr1,s|Ψsr〉+〈Ψsr|Πr0,s⊗1|Ψsr〉
)
,
(C4)
where the projector Πri,s acts on system Bi and 1 is the
identity operator acting on the other system. We write
4(q0 + q1) = µ0 + µ1, where
µ0 = 〈Ψ00|Π00,0 ⊗ 1|Ψ00〉+ 〈Ψ01|Π10,0 ⊗ 1|Ψ01〉
+〈Ψ10|1⊗Π01,1|Ψ10〉+ 〈Ψ11|1⊗Π11,1|Ψ11〉,(C5)
µ1 = 〈Ψ00|1⊗Π01,0|Ψ00〉+ 〈Ψ01|1⊗Π11,0|Ψ01〉
+〈Ψ10|Π00,1 ⊗ 1|Ψ10〉+ 〈Ψ11|Π10,1 ⊗ 1|Ψ11〉.(C6)
We note from the symmetry of the terms µi that the
maximum value of µ0, µ
max
0 , equals the maximum value
of µ1. Thus, q0 + q1 ≤ µmax0 /2. We show below that
µmax0 = 2 +
√
2. (C7)
Since, as mentioned above, the value q0 + q1 = 1+
1√
2
is
achieved by an optimal cloning strategy, or by measuring
in the Breidbart basis, equation (C2) follows.
We show (C7). We recall the definitions given in the
main text:
|ψ0k〉 = |k〉, |ψ1k〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉+ (−1)k|1〉), (C8)
8for k ∈ {0, 1}, and where 〈0|1〉 = 0. From (C3) and (C8),
we have
〈Ψ00|Ψ01〉 = 0, |Ψ1r〉 =
1√
2
(|Ψ00〉+ (−1)r|Ψ01〉
)
. (C9)
Using the second equality of (C9) and the relations(
Πri,s
)†
= Πri,s and Π
1
i,s = 1Bi − Π0i,s in (C5), we reduce
the expression of µ0 to
µ0 = 2 + 〈Ψ00|Π00,0 ⊗ 1|Ψ00〉 − 〈Ψ01|Π00,0 ⊗ 1|Ψ01〉
+2Re
(〈Ψ00|1⊗Π01,1|Ψ01〉
)
. (C10)
We express |Ψ0j〉 in term of states |αjkl〉 living in the
subspaces on which the projectors Πk0,0 and Π
l
1,1 act, for
j, k, l ∈ {0, 1}. We have
|Ψ0j〉 =
1∑
k=0
1∑
l=0
ajkl|αjkl〉, (C11)
where we impose the normalization conditions
〈αjkl|αjkl〉 = 1 and
1∑
k=0
1∑
l=0
|ajkl|2 = 1, (C12)
and where the following relation holds:
(
Πk0,0 ⊗Πl1,1
)|αjkl〉 = |αjkl〉. (C13)
Using the properties of projectors, Πri,sΠ
r′
i,s = δr,r′Π
r
i,s
and
(
Πri,s
)†
= Πri,s, we obtain from (C10), (C11) and
(C13) that
µ0 = 2 + 2Re
(
a∗000a100〈α000|α100〉+ a∗010a110〈α010|α110〉
)
+|a000|2 + |a001|2 − |a100|2 − |a101|2. (C14)
From (C11), (C13) and the fact that Πri,s are projectors,
the orthogonality constraint in (C9) reads
〈Ψ00|Ψ01〉 =
1∑
k=0
1∑
l=0
a∗0kla1kl〈α0kl|α1kl〉 = 0. (C15)
Using the expression (C14), subject to constraints (C12),
(C15) and |〈α0kl|α1kl〉| ≤ 1, we obtained numerically that
the maximum of µ0 is given by (C7), as claimed.
We give details of the numerical computation of µmax0 ,
which we performed with the Mathematica software. We
give below the mathematical expression input to the
Mathematica program.
The complex variables ajkl and 〈α0kl|α1kl〉 are defined
in terms of real variables cjkl, djkl, gkl and hkl for j, k, l ∈
{0, 1}, as follows:
ajkl = cjkl + idjkl, (C16)
〈α0kl|α1kl〉 = gkl + ihkl. (C17)
The constraints given by equations (C12) and (C15) re-
spectively read
1∑
k=0
1∑
l=0
(
(cjkl)
2 + (djkl)
2
)
= 1, (C18)
and
0 = g00(c000c100 + d000d100)− h00(c000d100 − c100d000)
+g01(c001c101 + d001d101)− h01(c001d101 − c101d001)
+g10(c010c110 + d010d110)− h10(c010d110 − c110d010)
+g11(c011c111 + d011d111)− h11(c011d111 − c111d011),
0 = g00(c000d100 − c100d000) + h00(c000c100 + d000d100)
+g01(c001d101 − c101d001) + h01(c001c101 + d001d101)
+g10(c010d110 − c110d010) + h10(c010c110 + d010d110)
+g11(c011d111 − c111d011) + h11(c011c111 + d011d111).
(C19)
The constraints |〈α0kl|α1kl〉| ≤ 1 are given by
(gkl)
2 + (hkl)
2 ≤ 1. (C20)
The expression for µ0 given by equation (C14) corre-
sponds to
µ0 = 2 +
1∑
l=0
(
(c00l)
2 + (d00l)
2 − (c10l)2 − (d10l)2
)
+2
(
g00(c000c100 + d000d100)
+h00(c100d000 − c000d100)
+g10(c010c110 + d010d110)
+h10(c110d010 − c010d110)
)
. (C21)
We computed the maximum value of µ0 given by
(C21), subject to the constraints (C18) – (C20). It was
found that µmax0 = 2 +
√
2, as given by equation (C7).
[1] A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 1447 (1999).
[2] A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 5382 (1999).
[3] A. Kent, J. Cryptology 18, 313 (2005).
[4] A. P. Kent, W. J. Munro, T. P. Spiller, and R. G.
Beausoleil, “Tagging systems,” US Patent No. 7,075,438
(2006).
[5] R. Colbeck and A. Kent,
Phys. Rev. A 73, 032320 (2006).
[6] R. Colbeck, Phys. Rev. A 76, 062308 (2007).
[7] R. Colbeck, Quantum And Relativistic Protocols For Se-
9cure Multi-Party Computation, Ph.D. thesis, University
of Cambridge (2009), eprint arXiv:0911.3814.
[8] R. A. Malaney, Phys. Rev. A 81, 042319 (2010).
[9] A. Kent, W. J. Munro, and T. P. Spiller,
Phys. Rev. A 84, 012326 (2011).
[10] A. Kent, Phys. Rev. A 84, 022335 (2011).
[11] H. Buhrman, N. Chandran, S. Fehr, R. Gelles,
V. Goyal, R. Ostrovsky, and C. Schaffner,
SIAM J. Comput. 43, 150 (2014).
[12] A. Kent, Quantum Inf. Process. 12, 1023 (2013).
[13] A. Kent, New J. Phys. 13, 113015 (2011).
[14] A. Kent, Phys. Rev. A 84, 012328 (2011).
[15] A. Kent, Class. Quantum Grav. 29, 224013 (2012).
[16] P. Hayden and A. May, (2012), arXiv:1210.0913.
[17] A. Kent, Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 130501 (2012).
[18] S. Croke and A. Kent, Phys. Rev. A 86, 052309 (2012).
[19] J. Kaniewski, M. Tomamichel,
E. Hanggi, and S. Wehner,
Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on 59, 4687 (2013).
[20] T. Lunghi, J. Kaniewski, F. Bussie`res, R. Houlmann,
M. Tomamichel, A. Kent, N. Gisin, S. Wehner, and
H. Zbinden, Phys. Rev. Lett. 111, 180504 (2013).
[21] Y. Liu, Y. Cao, M. Curty, S.-K. Liao, J. Wang, K. Cui,
Y.-H. Li, Z.-H. Lin, Q.-C. Sun, D.-D. Li, H.-F. Zhang,
Y. Zhao, T.-Y. Chen, C.-Z. Peng, Q. Zhang, A. Cabello,
and J.-W. Pan, Phys. Rev. Lett. 112, 010504 (2014).
[22] A. Kent, S. Massar, and J. Silman,
Sci. Rep. 4, 3901 (2014).
[23] T. Lunghi, J. Kaniewski, F. Bussie`res, R. Houl-
mann, M. Tomamichel, S. Wehner, and H. Zbinden,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 030502 (2015).
[24] E. Adlam and A. Kent,
Int. J. Quantum Inf. 13, 1550029 (2015).
[25] E. Adlam and A. Kent, Phys. Rev. A 92, 022315 (2015).
[26] K. Chakraborty, A. Chailloux, and A. Leverrier,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 115, 250501 (2015).
[27] S. Fehr and M. Fillinger, “On the composition
of two-prover commitments, and applications
to multi-round relativistic commitments,” Cryp-
tology ePrint Archive, Report 2016/113 (2016),
http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/113.
[28] E. Adlam and A. Kent, Phys. Rev. A 93, 062327 (2016).
[29] D. Mayers, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78, 3414 (1997).
[30] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 78, 3410 (1997).
[31] H.-K. Lo and H. Chau,
Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena 120, 177 (1998),
proceedings of the Fourth Workshop on Physics and
Consumption.
[32] A. Y. Kitaev, “Quantum coin-flipping,” (2002), talk at
QIP 2003.
[33] A. Ambainis, H. Buhrman, Y. Dodis, and H. Roehrig,
“Multyparty quantum coin flipping,” (2004),
arXiv:quant-ph/0304112.
[34] T. Rudolph, (2002), arXiv:quant-ph/0202143.
[35] H.-K. Lo, Phys. Rev. A 56, 1154 (1997).
[36] H. Buhrman, M. Christandl, and C. Schaffner,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 109, 160501 (2012).
[37] S. Even, O. Goldreich, and A. Lempel,
Commun. ACM 28, 637 (1985).
[38] J. Kilian, “Founding crytpography on oblivious transfer,” In
Proceedings of the Twentieth Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing, STOC ’88 (ACM, New York,
1988) pp. 20–31.
[39] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard, C. Cre´peau,
R. Jozsa, A. Peres, and W. K. Wootters,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 70, 1895 (1993).
[40] M. Tomamichel, S. Fehr, J. Kaniewski, and S. Wehner,
New J. Phys. 15, 103002 (2013).
[41] V. Scarani, S. Iblisdir, N. Gisin, and A. Ac´ın,
Rev. Mod. Phys. 77, 1225 (2005).
